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	<title>Siam News Network &#187; Top Stories</title>
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	<description>Asia News with a Business Perspective</description>
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		<title>Thailand to expand trade and investment with India</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/14433-thailand-to-expand-trade-and-investment-with-india/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/14433-thailand-to-expand-trade-and-investment-with-india/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2012 18:08:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>thailand-business-news</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[ New Delhi business newspaper economic times says that India and Thailand will sign a free trade agreement by the middle of this year, according to Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. ]]></description>
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		<title>Thailand plans Big Celebration for Chinese Year of the Dragon</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/14403-thailand-plans-big-celebration-for-chinese-year-of-the-dragon/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/14403-thailand-plans-big-celebration-for-chinese-year-of-the-dragon/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2012 20:42:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>thailand-business-news</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[ Many activities have been planned in Bangkok and other major provinces in celebration of the upcoming Chinese New Year and to welcome the Year of the Dragon.This years Chinese New Year’s Day falls on January 23. ]]></description>
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		<title>Terrorism in Thailand: the Swedish connection</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/14384-terrorism-in-thailand-the-swedish-connection/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/14384-terrorism-in-thailand-the-swedish-connection/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2012 01:19:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>thailand-business-news</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[ Thai police led Atris Hussein, a 48 year-old Lebanese man with suspected links to a Hezbollah to search a commercial building in Samut Sakhon province, adjacent to the capital, where they discovered chemical substances which could be used in making explosives. ]]></description>
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		<title>China Power Dams on The Mekong are setting off alarm bells</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/14362-china-power-dams-on-the-mekong-are-setting-off-alarm-bells/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/14362-china-power-dams-on-the-mekong-are-setting-off-alarm-bells/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Jan 2012 20:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>thailand-business-news</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vietnam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vietnam]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://siamnews.net/news/14362-china-power-dams-on-the-mekong-are-setting-off-alarm-bells/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ The Mekong, one of the world’s major rivers, starting in Tibet and flowing through south China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, provides sustenance through irrigation and fishing to those living in its basin. But it also provides hydroelectric power through dams, three of which were built in China and with more planned. ]]></description>
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		<title>South Asia in 2011: a year of strained relations</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/asean/14327-south-asia-in-2011-a-year-of-strained-relations/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/asean/14327-south-asia-in-2011-a-year-of-strained-relations/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2012 03:00:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>East Asia Forum</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asean]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://siamnews.net/news/14327-south-asia-in-2011-a-year-of-strained-relations/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ Author: Sandy Gordon, ANU South Asia is a vast region encompassing eight nations (if we include Afghanistan) and over one-fifth of humanity. It is difficult to do it justice in this short summary of the year’s events. Foremost among the region’s significant developments is the killing of Osama bin Laden in a US raid on 2 May. This is important not just for its effect on al-Qaeda, but because it made possible Washington’s claim that the US could now leave Afghanistan with its ‘mission accomplished’. By the end of 2014 there will be only a rump of about 20,000 NATO troops remaining.  At the same time, the raid also triggered a marked deterioration in the US-Pakistan relationship , already troubled by the Raymond Davis affair. The net result is that although the impetus on the US to leave Afghanistan has increased, the prospect of an orderly departure and satisfactory final outcome has declined. The introduction of a ‘strategic’ element to the India-Afghanistan relationship during President Karzai’s New Delhi visit in early October and the NATO attack on a Pakistani border post in November — in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed — further diminished prospects for a peace based on compromise. Following the incident, Pakistan boycotted the vital Bonn conference on 5 December and closed the Pakistan-Afghan border to NATO supplies. Pakistan’s uncertain role was highlighted by President Zardari’s failure to return from Dubai in a timely manner following medical treatment. In the worsening climate, Pakistan drew still closer to China. Islamabad not only assessed that the US relationship is a political millstone round its neck, but also that the US is a diminishing regional power — at the same time as China is rising. On a brighter note, in early November Pakistan agreed to grant India most favoured nation status in trade , which India accorded Pakistan some years ago. Trade is still miniscule, and given cross-border tensions is unlikely to lift significantly in the near future. But the decision is symbolically important. In India, growth slowed and inflation soared, exacerbated by a steadily falling rupee, such that by year’s end, there was a risk that India — which is heavily dependent on foreign capital to support its twin deficits — might become caught up in the investor caution now affecting Europe.  Politically too the Indian National Congress-led United Progressive Alliance has suffered from the widespread perception that it is even more corrupt than previous Indian governments. The massive 2G telecommunications scam was central to this perception. The corruption issue has paralysed the operations of Parliament at a time when urgent economic reforms are needed — for example, derailing efforts to introduce a 51 per cent FDI regime in retailing. This highly negative climate for the government is background to the state-level elections in Uttar Pradesh, scheduled for 2012. These elections in India’s giant state are considered a bellwether for national elections in 2014. India’s troubled relationship with China has not significantly improved over the year. Following New Delhi’s decision to allow the Dalai Lama to speak at a conference in the capital, China cancelled the 2011 border talks, scheduled for 28–29 November. Despite this, military-to-military relations are to resume, following India’s previous decision to cancel ties over the Kashmir visa issue. Meanwhile, Nepal has bowed to Chinese pressure and is now allowing far fewer Tibetans to cross the border. The Maoists and their moderate opponents also failed to reach a compromise in the stalemate over the induction of an estimated 19,000 Maoist fighters into the army. Until Nepal overcomes this stalemate, it will continue to delay the long-awaited new constitution, instability will persist and the economy will languish. Despite the fact that the normally pro-India Awami League is currently in power in Bangladesh, water continues to be a sensitive issue between Dhaka and New Delhi, primarily owing to the traditional row over sharing the Ganges’ water, but also because of Indian proposals to build a dam in Manipur. Bangladeshi irrigators are suspicious that the run-of-river hydro scheme will diminish their access to water, and the issue has become highly sensitive for the ruling party, often accused by the opposition of ‘selling out’ to India. Against this troubled background in South Asia, Sri Lanka has had a relatively stable year. The Rajapaksa government continues to tighten its hold in the aftermath of the civil war, shrugging off international efforts to draw attention to alleged human rights abuses. They are assisted at home by the fact that Sri Lanka’s economic position is enviable, with an estimated growth rate this year of 8.5 per cent. Sandy Gordon is a Visiting Fellow at RegNet , College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University. The South Asia Cold War ‘quadrilateral’ redux? US-India relations: Problems posed by Afghanistan and Iran Some thoughts about the South Asian ‘region’ ]]></description>
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		<title>After Kim Jong-il: will there be change or continuity in North Korean economic policy?</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/top-stories/14294-after-kim-jong-il-will-there-be-change-or-continuity-in-north-korean-economic-policy/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/top-stories/14294-after-kim-jong-il-will-there-be-change-or-continuity-in-north-korean-economic-policy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Dec 2011 15:00:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>East Asia Forum</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vietnam]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://siamnews.net/news/14294-after-kim-jong-il-will-there-be-change-or-continuity-in-north-korean-economic-policy/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ Author: Bradley O. Babson At the moment of his accession to power, Kim Jong-il inherited the devastating impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent trade shock to North Korea’s economic output, the onset of the worst famine in modern history, and a humanitarian crisis that required a direct appeal to the outside world for help . By the late 1990’s, he was forced to accept the realities of dependence on international aid, the rise of farmers markets as a grassroots response to the famine, and the introduction of capitalist notions such as ‘profits’ in the Constitution itself. Kim even briefly entertained the notion of establishing relationships with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, attracted by the prospects for international finance, but balking at requirements for transparency, conditionality, and rules-based relations . Throughout his leadership tenure he only half-heartedly and grudgingly accepted the growing role for markets in the North’s economy and maintained a deep ambivalence to the prospect of economic empowerment of the North Korean people. His desire to maintain highly-centralised control over all aspects of North Korean society was sharply at odds with the decentralisation of information and decision-making needed for a market economy to replace a failed socialist economic management system. As a result, economic policy in the Kim Jong-il era was more shaped by events and forces for change than used as a tool to guide a managed process for national development. Experiments in economic reforms were not accompanied by policies or the institution-building that would have been needed for recreating the economic success stories of China and Vietnam. Rather, the guiding light of economic policy for Kim Jong-il was mobilising resources for his purse from both domestic and foreign sources.  He was quite creative in devising ways to achieve this, such as demands for ‘loyalty’ payments, structuring of foreign exchange earning activities to send the cash to the top , negotiating with foreigners to get goodies for concessions, and pursuing illegal and internationally-sanctioned revenue-raising ventures.  At the end of the day, the North Korean economy under Kim Jong-il remains highly vulnerable to shortages of food, energy, and foreign exchange, with pressures for transformation of the economic system coming from both internal and external dynamics of change at work in North Korea. Looking ahead, the key question is not whether there will be changes in economic policy but whether changes will be in the direction of building a market economy or governed by a new dynamic of competition for resources among contending parties for power.  The more the new regime leans towards the Worker’s Party, the more likely it will follow Chinese supported policies of developing a market economy under the guidance of the Party and gradually shift to funding defence needs from a centralised budget rather than the military having its own economic organs such as trading companies and banks that service them. The more the regime tilts towards the military, the more likely that competition for resources will trump incentives for pursuing systemic change. While there may be an inclination to perpetuate the patronage practices of the elites by the Kim family, it is not likely that loyalties will transfer simply to the new leadership through such patronage alone. New incentives for supporting the regime will need to be pursued.  Key metrics of such changes will be in: 1) the ownership and transferability rights of assets; 2) the restructuring of the financial system including banking supervision, monetary-management policies, and development of the tax system and public expenditure policies to accommodate a market economy; 3) the support for decentralisation of economic decision-making and empowerment of traders and entrepreneurs; 4) the willingness to follow rules-based international practices in commerce and finance; and 5) the legal reforms to protect rights of parties in a market economy. This is a tall order, but one that might lead to a new dawn for North Korea. Bradley O. Babson is a consultant on Asian affairs with a focus on Korea and Northeast Asia economic cooperation. He is retired from a career at the World Bank, with a concentration in East Asia. In the early 1990s he worked on the opening up of Vietnam and was the first World Bank Resident Representative in Hanoi. Kim Jong Il’s death: continuity plus opportunity to engage North Korea: new opportunities in a post-Kim Jong-il landscape Kim Jong-il’s visit to China: What should we expect? ]]></description>
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		<title>Thai Foreign Minister to issue new Thaksin Passport</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/14289-thai-foreign-minister-to-issue-new-thaksin-passport/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/14289-thai-foreign-minister-to-issue-new-thaksin-passport/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 02:57:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>thailand-business-news</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[ Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul on Friday said the previous governments order rescinding ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatras passport has been revoked and the process to reissue the ousted premiers passport rests with the ministrys Consular Affairs Department. ]]></description>
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		<title>China’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/politics/14222-china%e2%80%99s-participation-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/politics/14222-china%e2%80%99s-participation-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 11 Dec 2011 03:23:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>East Asia Forum</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[us asia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://siamnews.net/news/14222-china%e2%80%99s-participation-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ Author: Shiro Armstrong, ANU In President Obama’s landmark speech in Canberra last month, an over-riding theme was that the United States welcomes China’s rise so long as it plays by the global rules. Yet those rules are dynamic, and there is a need to have China involved in setting them given the scale of China and its importance to the regional and global economy, as well as to global security. China needs to help set the rules and agree to them so that it has buy-in — not have those rules created around it. The latter scenario may have been possible a decade ago, but not now. It is crucial, then, that a major trade policy initiative in the Asia Pacific, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), include China, else it will become one of the set of rules created around China, constraining not promoting one of the main trans-Pacific economic relationships. As the major growth engine of the global economy, China&#8217;s exclusion from the TPP raises questions about the TPP’s likely success. The TPP’s purpose is to weld the region together and lock in growth of trans-Pacific economic relationships. The central strategic challenge for the TPP, therefore, relates to China&#8217;s membership. But can China join? And should it join? The biggest risk of the TPP is political: that it might divide the region strategically between its members and the rest, with China being on the outside. The TPP has been supported by two prominent US trade policy figures, Fred Bergsten and Jeffrey Schott of the Petersen Institute of International Economics, as a way, they say, for the US to engage in East Asia as ‘China propelled the advance of Asian regionalism’. ‘These countries are well on the way toward creating an Asian bloc, a development that could “draw a line down the Pacific” by discriminating against [the US]’, they add. Yet if the TPP proceeds on terms set by the US, it would be very difficult for China to join , and the TPP itself, according to Christopher Findlay , may ‘drive the region apart with systematic exclusion of non-members, including China’. This wedge through the middle of the Pacific will be political as well as economic. China would have to join the TPP on US terms as the TPP has now become a creature fashioned largely by Washington. Bergsten and Schott give priority to Japanese and Korean membership, envisioning the use of those strengthened alliance relationships to balance the influence of China. The difficulty for China in joining the TPP stems from aiming for an agreement designed by, and for, countries able to digest US-moulded intellectual property rights (IPR), labour and environment standards, and other commercial settings. Many will be watching the conditions which are defined for Vietnam&#8217;s entry, the least developed country in the current TPP line-up. If the standards of entry for Vietnam are appropriate, there will need to be long phase-in periods to meet them. The benefits of US market access may dominate potential costs for Vietnam; this is not necessarily the case with China. The US has been pushing for more regulatory discipline for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the negotiations around the TPP and, in particular, competitive neutrality between SOEs and private enterprises in member economies. Vietnam and Malaysia are the two economies currently involved in the TPP negotiations in which SOEs are prominent or dominant. Reform of SOEs and the privatisation process is a deeply domestic issue that will not be resolved quickly in China. The WTO accession experience shows that locking China into reforms can only occur, especially now given its size, when it is committed to using external institutions as tools in its own interest to open up and reform its domestic economy. A TPP agenda and negotiations in which the US effectively declares itself the gatekeeper is likely to make it extremely difficult for China to commit to the TPP and join. If China is ever to accede to the TPP, the agreement would need to be designed with open accession terms that allow China to meet its own interests. It is not that China should not be bound by TPP rules: it is that China would need to be persuaded to bind itself, consistently with its own reform agenda, in the areas covered by the TPP and on its own terms. If the TPP ends up being a set of related bilateral agreements (a bowl of noodles within a bowl of noodles), for which the US has thus far revealed a preference ( see Claude Barfield ), China will have to negotiate bilaterally with the US in order to join a broader TPP — no matter what the wishes of other members; and any agreement would require separate approval by the United States Congress. That is rightly viewed as a set-up. Expansion of membership and creation of an inclusive agreement was the original aim of the TPP, and that is where its potential economic benefits lie. But easy expansion of membership is perhaps the biggest challenge. The risk is that, once an agreement is negotiated in whatever shape or form, sign-on by non-members in the region (an explicit goal) will be difficult with extra requirements for new members and individual-member veto over new membership, notably, by the US. If the agreement requires consensus from members (or incumbents) on new entrants rather than the meeting of carefully-constructed and transparent rules of entry, effective veto-power on new membership will be built into the arrangement. A transparent and established process with clear criteria in application for membership is needed for two reasons. First, it will give members less discretion over the conditionality they can add to individual members for accession. Second, a membership bid would not have to be triggered by an invitation from members — membership that is contingent on invitation would create maximum discretion for incumbents and is not congenial to expanding membership. Automatic sign-on is not constitutionally easy for the US given that Congress will have to approve each new member separately. But that was exactly the original idea of the TPP’s predecessor, the P3 and P4 agreements with Chile, Brunei, New Zealand and Singapore. Perhaps China should announce it wants to join negotiations right away, not to play spoiler, but so that it can engage directly in defining what the rules for much of Asia Pacific trade should be. That would be the surest strategy in ensuring that the TPP was open and dynamic, not static and exclusive. Otherwise there are likely to be one of two broad outcomes from the TPP initiative. The first is that the US succeeds quickly, as it has signalled it wants to, in locking the other 8 pliant negotiators into an early deal that is full of exceptions and has limited or negative liberalising effect but the exclusionary features of which maintain symbolic pressure on non-members like China. This might be called the just-another-trivial-FTA-outcome. The second is that the negotiators hold to more rigorous liberalising targets that will take much longer to negotiate. That is likely to entrench Chinese exclusion more deeply. Either way there is no indication that the intention is to draw China into the process. And that will not only be to China&#8217;s cost, but also to cost of China&#8217;s partners in the region and global welfare. Shiro Armstrong is a research fellow at the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University and is co-editor of the East Asia Forum. He is also editor of the new book The Politics and the Economics of Integration in Asia and the Pacific (Routledge, 2011). A longer version of this essay can be found here as EABER Working Paper No. 71 , 9 December 2011. U.S. trade policy in Asia: Going for the Trans-Pacific Partnership? The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trans-Pacific Partnership update ]]></description>
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		<title>US$46 million budget to restore Ayutthaya historical sites</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/news/14195-us46-million-budget-to-restore-ayutthaya-historical-sites/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/news/14195-us46-million-budget-to-restore-ayutthaya-historical-sites/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Dec 2011 21:43:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>thailand-business-news</dc:creator>
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		<category><![CDATA[ayutthaya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[ Ayutthaya’s historical sites have been heavily affected by recent flooding in Thailand. Thailand’s Ministry of Culture initially sought the budget of Bt1.4 billion baht (about US$46 million ) from the cabinet to restore Ayutthaya’s historical sites. ]]></description>
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		<title>China and its Adjudication Committees</title>
		<link>http://siamnews.net/asean/14175-china-and-its-adjudication-committees/</link>
		<comments>http://siamnews.net/asean/14175-china-and-its-adjudication-committees/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Dec 2011 03:00:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>East Asia Forum</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asean]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legal system]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[ Author: Xin Frank He, City University of Hong Kong In authoritarian regimes like China, courts and their judges decide legal cases behind closed doors . How they do so is rarely examined — but is critically important in comparative judicial studies. China’s unique Adjudication Committees are the highest decision-making body in any court, and operate at each level of the Chinese court system, wielding enormous influence. By analysing the minutes of the Adjudication Committee from a basic-level court, several patterns can be found regarding their operational and decision-making processes. First, almost all of the criminal cases (96.8 per cent) were reviewed by the court’s Committee, as a result of jurisdictional rules. Second, and more importantly, the Committee modified almost 41 per cent of the adjudicating judges’ suggested opinions in criminal cases — a much higher proportion than in civil cases. Third, the Committee tended to increase the penalty given to defendants, especially when the penalty was a fine. Overall, the data suggests that among the criminal cases reviewed by the Committee, legally speaking, very few were difficult or significant, but a relatively high percentage of the adjudicating judges’ opinions were modified. In contrast, many of the civil cases reviewed were legally complex, but the Committee was less willing to intervene. The data also suggests that decision making within the Committee is dictated by the administrative ranking system inside the court, meaning the court president’s authority is enormous. In fact, among the criminal cases in which the adjudicating judges’ suggested opinions were changed, 91 per cent were changed largely according to the president’s suggestions, and 7 per cent according to the director of the criminal division. Only 1.3 per cent of changes were based on other members’ suggestions. Furthermore, the data and analysis suggest that instead of achieving its declared goals, the Committee has largely degenerated into a device to shelter individual judges and Committee members from responsibility. In particular, judges adjudicating civil cases will submit difficult examples to the Committee, thus divesting themselves of responsibility. In criminal cases, adjudicating judges do not have much choice as to whether or not to submit for review — but being reviewed by the Committee is not inconsistent with their interests, as once a case is reviewed, the risk of being caught for corruption or for deciding cases incorrectly almost disappears. Committee members are equally safe. Since neither a vote nor a signature is required to enforce their decisions, members can easily inject their legal and extra-legal views without taking personal responsibility for any subsequent outcome. This is also true for the president, who decides on the majority of reviewed cases, but who does so in the Committee’s name. And for particularly significant cases that may have social consequences (for which the president may thus be held responsible) he can simply suggest the Committee seek instruction from upper-level courts, or communicates with the local government in advance about his ruling. Consequently, the Adjudication Committee creates a black hole of responsibility in China’s legal system. The Committee ultimately plays a limited role in promoting legal consistency and resisting external influences. Given these findings, researchers must turn their attention to rethinking the appropriate role of the Adjudication Committee in Chinese courts specifically, and the relationship between judges and the regime in authoritarian states generally. Dr Xin Frank He is Associate Professor at the Centre for Chinese and Comparative Law , City University of Hong Kong. Judicial independence in authoritarian regimes: The China experience Chinese law after sixty years The folly of legalism for Fiji&#8217;s people ]]></description>
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