By Russell Leigh Moses
Is Premier Wen Jiabao taking a run at reform again?
That’s the question that has been rattling around in China-watching circles ever since Wen’s final press conference at the National People’s Congress last month, during which he warned in sharp terms about the dangers of nostalgia over mass movements and insisted that without political reforms “it is impossible to continue economic reform, and the gains we have made may be lost.”
- Associated Press
- Wen Jiabao
One view is that Wen is not being genuine in his efforts at reform—in other words, that’s he’s Beijing’s consummate actor, wheeling out the rhetoric to burnish his legacy for the history books. Other analyses have portrayed Wen as a lone champion of restructuring, fighting a solitary battle against the dark forces of oppression and hardline gunslingers.
But Wen’s no performer. Nor is he some sort of cowboy. Instead, he is the sharp and public end of a larger reform-minded posse within the Communist Party – a group of cadres who believe short-term stability may have been largely achieved but the long-term legitimacy of the Party remains unsecured.
That legitimacy, in their view, can only be achieved by loosening up the current system–and by preventing the political Left from taking to the streets to force social change.
Thus far, the reformers have been frustrated from moving forward with political experiments. They’ve been thwarted by the hardline emphasis on change within the Party—those pushing for more morality and better training for cadres, instead of transparency and accountability. “Purity” is the new watchword, with political restructuring pushed aside.
But now Wen and his colleagues have started shoving back. During a recent inspection tour in southern China, Wen was especially blunt about setbacks in China’s economic situation. He noted the hardships caused by “insufficient domestic demand, rising costs of exports, and the downward pressure on businesses generally”. Wen also blasted the monopoly enjoyed by State banks, right on the heels of his sponsorship of an initiative to let Wenzhou experiment with a new type of financing scheme.
China’s number two also took a further step away from State companies, emphasizing the crucial role played by small firms and entrepreneurship.
On one level, Wen’s focus on these issues appears to be in keeping with the current Party line, which calls for an emphasis economic questions over other concerns.
But there’s also ample reason to see Wen’s latest moves in a larger light: as an effort to get his comrades to start reorganizing the economy, in the hope that political reform might then follow. Populist policies that rebalance the economy could then evolve into political restructuring.
By focusing on economic restructuring, reformers pledge loyalty to the Center’s new approach—talk about economics, not about politics—while bringing to light what ails the system: State cartels and other vested interests controlling finances and natural resources, stifling innovation and suffocating reorganization. There’s agreement in many circles for the need to weaken State economic control somehow; but previous efforts to do so have miscarried. Wen and his camp seem to be moving to take another shot.
Why is Wen saddling up to move now? To figure out the answer, one can turn editorials and commentaries in the official press, which increasingly are calling for “unity” and “stability” — indications that neither is necessarily in abundance right now.
The purpose of these essays in mainline Party media is clearly to rally support in the ranks. Evidently, some cadres have been slow in responding.
And then there’s the fast-disappearing article about the meaning of a Communist Party General Secretary in China. The essay appeared with little fanfare some days ago, while President (and Party General Secretary) Hu Jintao was still abroad. Ostensibly a historical review about the origin and evolution about the position and role of a Party leader, the piece spoke of the restricted role of the General Secretary, noting that the “the Party forbids any form of personal worship” and that Party also “ensures that the activities of the party’s leaders fall under the supervision of the party and the people.”
How did such an article get to appear in the first place? Was this a blast by Leftists still irate over the sacking of Bo Xilai? Or did reformers who want to limit Hu’s authority to freeze conversations about political reform sponsor its appearance?
Whatever the case, by yesterday, the essay was getting more difficult to find, with a number of official websites reporting its removal. Meanwhile, local media in South China praised Wen’s visit and advised cadres to study it carefully — a possible precursor to wider favorable coverage.
Despite some of the rumors floating around in recent weeks, there’s no reason to think that the party is so riven by dissension that it’s ready to implode. In fact, there continue to be brave and healthy debates throughout the state media about everything from spawning “social trust” to different responses to rumor-mongering.
Still, this recent political uncertainty does provide the opportunity for those pushing restructuring to make their case again. Perhaps Wen thinks he might still know the way: to use economic distress to show that political reform is still the solution.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
In recent years, China has re-invigorated its support for leading state-owned enterprises in sectors it considers important to “economic security,” explicitly looking to foster globally competitive national champions.
The Chinese government seeks to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, and is focusing on nuclear and other alternative energy development.
China is also the second largest trading nation in the world and the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods.
The PRC government’s decision to permit China to be used by multinational corporations as an export platform has made the country a major competitor to other Asian export-led economies, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia.
Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.
The disparities between the two sectors have combined to form an economic-cultural-social gap between the rural and urban areas, which is a major division in Chinese society.
China has acquired some highly sophisticated production facilities through trade and also has built a number of advanced engineering plants capable of manufacturing an increasing range of sophisticated equipment, including nuclear weapons and satellites, but most of its industrial output still comes from relatively ill-equipped factories.
By the early 1990s these subsidies began to be eliminated, in large part due to China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which carried with it requirements for further economic liberalization and deregulation.
Both forums will start on Tuesday.
“The growth rate (for ODI) in the next few years will be much higher than previous years,” Shen said, without elaborating.
China is expected to have 200 million cars on the road by 2020, increasing pressure on energy security and the environment, government officials said yesterday.
Although China is still a developing country with a relatively low per capita income, it has experienced tremendous economic growth since the late 1970s.
Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.
Except for the oasis farming in Xinjiang and Qinghai, some irrigated areas in Inner Mongolia and Gansu, and sheltered valleys in Tibet, agricultural production is restricted to the east.
Horses, donkeys, and mules are work animals in the north, while oxen and water buffalo are used for plowing chiefly in the south.
Growing domestic demand beginning in the mid-1990s, however, has forced the nation to import increasing quantities of petroleum.
There are also deposits of vanadium, magnetite, copper, fluorite, nickel, asbestos, phosphate rock, pyrite, and sulfur.
Coal is the single most important energy source in China; coal-fired thermal electric generators provide over 70% of the country’s electric power.
China’s economy, though strengthened by the more liberal economic policies of the 1980s and 90s, continues to suffer from inadequate transportation, communication, and energy resources.
Go here to see the original:
Wen Jiabao’s Reform Push More Than Just Political Theater
