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Author: Doan Hong Quang, World Bank

Consensus-based policy making is a salient feature of Vietnam, where important decisions are collectively made.

Consensus is needed not only for the formulation of a reform vision but also for the elaboration and implementation of this vision. Doi Moi, the most successful economic reform to date, would certainly not have occurred in 1986 if no consensus were reached at the VI Party Congress.

A series of events in 2011 indicate that a vital consensus for the acceleration of economic reforms has been attained. Vietnam’s first major economic event for 2011 was the Communist Party Congress held in January, which set out Vietnam’s development strategy for the next 10 years. Like its predecessor, the 2011–2020 Strategy adopted at the Congress places great emphasis on rapid economic growth, with a target of 7–8 per cent average annual GDP growth over the next decade. The strategy puts increased attention on the quality of growth, including targets on macroeconomic stability and requirements for clarifying the role of the state in a market economy. Nevertheless, the ambitious quantitative growth target suggests a continuation rather than a fundamental break with previous strategies.

But events took a significant turn just a few weeks after the Congress. In late February the government issued Resolution 11, aiming to restore Vietnam’s macroeconomic stability and cool down an overheated economy. Specifically, the resolution sought to address high levels of inflation, tension in the foreign exchange market, high nominal interest rates and declining foreign exchange reserves. The implementation of Resolution 11 remained a top priority in the government’s agenda throughout 2011, and reviews of its implementation continue to take place regularly. Resolution 11 represents a decisive switch from growth to stability. For the first time, there is an official government policy document that completely neglects the term ‘growth’ in its targets. Its longevity signals a significant change in the mindset of Vietnam’s policy makers.

Signs of a radical shift in economic strategy became more evident when the new administration came into power in July. Several workshops and focus group discussions were held to facilitate policy dialogues regarding the restructuring of Vietnam’s economy to improve efficiency and competitiveness. From this process, consensus was reached on Vietnam’s strategic development priorities, identifying major areas for reform in the coming years. This consensus argues for radical transformation in three areas: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the financial sector and public investment. The need for reform was also officially documented in the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) for the period 2011–2015, which was approved by the National Assembly in November.

Following these events, Vietnam recorded good economic growth in 2011, with an estimated rate of GDP growth at 5.8 per cent. Exports performed very well, increasing by 33 per cent despite a significant decline in global demand. This robust GDP and export growth prevailed over a significant contraction in fiscal and monetary policy, and Vietnam’s strong export performance contributed notably to the reduction of trade deficits and the foreign exchange market’s stabilisation. The rate of inflation also slowed in the last four months, largely due to the implementation of Resolution 11.

The adoption of Resolution 11 and the SEDP in particular indicate that Vietnam has achieved consensus on accelerating market-based reforms in ‘difficult’ reform areas, namely SOEs, the financial sector and public investment. The recent release of an ambitious proposal for SOE reform through to 2020, developed by the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development, provides further evidence of this consensus. According to the proposal, about 44 per cent of the remaining 1300 full SOEs will be equitised in the next four years.

In this context, 2012 will be a very challenging year for Vietnam. The country still has to deal with an overheating economy, and inflationary pressures remain a genuine threat to the country’s economic stability. The banking sector is vulnerable, with a rising share of non-performing loans resulting from a long period of extraordinary credit growth. Challenges also lie in transforming the SEDP’s vision into specific actions. The plan calls for a fundamental restructuring of the economy, and while many agree on the vision of the reform, the formulation of a feasible action plan will take time, owing to the likelihood of resistance from economically strong interest groups.

The Vietnamese government is developing a detailed action plan for its ambitious restructuring strategy. It is expected that this plan will be approved by the end of the first quarter of 2012. The timeframe looks very ambitious as consensus for detailed actions still needs to be built. But there is a significant factor which may speed up the implementation process: while the market economy was an unfamiliar concept in previous times, it now receives strong support from the vast majority of Vietnamese people.

Dr Doan Hong Quang is a Senior Economist at the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Vietnam. This is part of a special feature: 2011 in review and the year ahead.

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Vietnam: the beginning of another economic transformation?

As if the reputation of China’s economic data wasn’t shaky enough already, an odd bureaucratic tug of war is casting new doubt on one of the country’s more closely watched indicators.

China’s official Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), a gauge of the nation’s manufacturing activity, has been jointly released by the National Bureau of Statistics and an industry association called the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing (CFLP) since 2005. Now, however, each body is trying to claim the data for itself.

The dispute originated with a statement posted on the Bureau of Statistics website on January 6 (in Chinese) saying it was the bureau that conducted the manager surveys that underpin the index conducted by the bureau. According to the statement, the CFLP merely published the survey under the authorization of the bureau.

The statement also quoted Pan Jiancheng, deputy director of the bureau’s China Economic Monitoring & Analysis Center, as saying the bureau planned to integrate all economic climate surveys and publish them as a group because “whoever conducts the survey should be the one to publish it.”

Three days later, the federation said in a statement on its own website (in Chinese) that PMI would not be part of the official climate surveys to be published by the statistics bureau.

“Somebody from the Bureau of Statistics is unhappy that we are doing such a good job with the PMI and decided to get tricky,” Cai Jin, deputy director of the CFLP, told the Shanghai-based Oriental Morning Post this week (in Chinese). “This has very negative influence on China’s PMI data.”

CFLP said in its statement that it submitted a request to establish the index in 2004 and that the NBS said it supported the proposal but asked the federation can make use of bureau’s existing enterprise survey resources to avoid redundancy. “Our federation is responsible for the release, analysis and interpretation of the survey,” CFLP said in its statement, adding that it is common practice for independent organizations to publish PMI to ensure objectivity.

According to its website, the CLFP, which claims to have thousands of purchasing manager members, is the only purchasing industry association approved by the State Council, China’s cabinet.

In the days since the Bureau of Statistics published its statement, Mr. Cai said, financial institutions and news media have pelting the CLFP with questions, expressing concern that the bureau might manipulate PMI based on other macroeconomic data.

“That’s why we have to clear things out,” Oriental Morning Post quoted Mr. Cai as saying.

China’s Purchasing Managers Index rose to 50.3 in December compared with 49.0 in November, indicating an increase in manufacturing activity. The rise came after HSBC Holdings PLC’s survey of purchasing managers showed manufacturing activity contracting in December, though at a more moderate pace than in the previous month.

The HSBC PMI has showed contractions in manufacturing in all but one of the past six months, painting a significantly less optimistic picture than the Chinese government’s competing PMI. Analysts say the HSBC PMI has been weaker because it surveys more purchasing managers from smaller firms, which have had difficulty accessing loans from banks.

– Liyan Qi

Reforms started in the late 1970s with the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of stock markets, the rapid growth of the non-state sector, and the opening to foreign trade and investment.

In 2009, the global economic downturn reduced foreign demand for Chinese exports for the first time in many years.

China is the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with an average growth rate of 10% for the past 30 years.

Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.

Agricultural output has been vulnerable to the effects of weather, while industry has been more directly influenced by the government.

China has acquired some highly sophisticated production facilities through trade and also has built a number of advanced engineering plants capable of manufacturing an increasing range of sophisticated equipment, including nuclear weapons and satellites, but most of its industrial output still comes from relatively ill-equipped factories.

China’s ongoing economic transformation has had a profound impact not only on China but on the world.

Both forums will start on Tuesday.

But “this is just a beginning.

It also aims to sell more than 15 million of the most fuel-efficient vehicles in the world each year by then.

Although China is still a developing country with a relatively low per capita income, it has experienced tremendous economic growth since the late 1970s.

Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.

Except for the oasis farming in Xinjiang and Qinghai, some irrigated areas in Inner Mongolia and Gansu, and sheltered valleys in Tibet, agricultural production is restricted to the east.

China ranks first in world production of red meat (including beef, veal, mutton, lamb, and pork).

Oil fields discovered in the 1960s and after made China a net exporter, and by the early 1990s, China was the world’s fifth-ranked oil producer.

China is among the world’s four top producers of antimony, magnesium, tin, tungsten, and zinc, and ranks second (after the United States) in the production of salt, sixth in gold, and eighth in lead ore.

China also has extensive hydroelectric energy potential, notably in Yunnan, W Sichuan, and E Tibet, although hydroelectric power accounts for only 5% of the country’s total energy production.

There are railroads to North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, and Vietnam, and road connections to Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Myanmar.

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China’s Stats Bureau in Odd Ownership Spat Over Important Index

Bloomberg News ANZ has received approval to sell its 9.6% stake in Vietnam’s Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank, known as Sacombank, to Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank, or Eximbank. ANZ established its relationship with Sacombank in 2005, but its self-branded business has grown significantly larger following local incorporation in 2008 and the purchase of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s institutional business in Vietnam in 2009. According to ANZ CEO Asia Pacific Europe and America Alex Thursby, ANZ has recently expanded its automated teller machine (ATM) network, launched internet banking for its Vietnamese customers and opened a 24/7 call center. It now has ten branches, allowing it to offer services covering personal banking, small-to-medium sized business as well as corporate and institutional banking in Vietnam. Deal Journal Australia has more.

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ANZ Agrees Sale Of 9.6% Stake In Vietnam’s Sacombank

China’s real estate scene is reminiscent of the 2007 US market: developers are slashing prices and infuriating owners who paid top yuan for properties. Problems in the real estate market are extending into steel, banking, mining and other sectors. Vacant developments are numerous because wealthy Chinese savers have few alternatives for investing growing wealth. “Beijing’s response to the global financial crisis added jet fuel to the fire,” writes Patrick Chovanec for Foreign Affairs, arguing that investors, not urban residents contributed to the bubble. “To maintain GDP growth of nearly ten percent during a massive downturn in global demand, China’s leaders engineered a lending boom that expanded the country’s money supply by roughly two-thirds.” Developers, after ignoring warnings to ease up on capacity, have urged the government to lift restrictions on owning multiple homes. By letting the bubble pop, the government could instantly create affordable housing for less affluent Chinese. – YaleGlobal Speculation, excess inventory, vacant developments, price reductions – a host of factors are set to undermine China’s real estate market and economic growth Patrick Chovanec Foreign Affairs, 26 December 2011 Rights:Copyright © 2002-2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

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China’s Real Estate Bubble May Have Just Popped

Author: Bradley O. Babson

At the moment of his accession to power, Kim Jong-il inherited the devastating impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent trade shock to North Korea’s economic output, the onset of the worst famine in modern history, and a humanitarian crisis that required a direct appeal to the outside world for help.

By the late 1990’s, he was forced to accept the realities of dependence on international aid, the rise of farmers markets as a grassroots response to the famine, and the introduction of capitalist notions such as ‘profits’ in the Constitution itself. Kim even briefly entertained the notion of establishing relationships with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, attracted by the prospects for international finance, but balking at requirements for transparency, conditionality, and rules-based relations. Throughout his leadership tenure he only half-heartedly and grudgingly accepted the growing role for markets in the North’s economy and maintained a deep ambivalence to the prospect of economic empowerment of the North Korean people. His desire to maintain highly-centralised control over all aspects of North Korean society was sharply at odds with the decentralisation of information and decision-making needed for a market economy to replace a failed socialist economic management system. As a result, economic policy in the Kim Jong-il era was more shaped by events and forces for change than used as a tool to guide a managed process for national development.

Experiments in economic reforms were not accompanied by policies or the institution-building that would have been needed for recreating the economic success stories of China and Vietnam. Rather, the guiding light of economic policy for Kim Jong-il was mobilising resources for his purse from both domestic and foreign sources.  He was quite creative in devising ways to achieve this, such as demands for ‘loyalty’ payments, structuring of foreign exchange earning activities to send the cash to the top, negotiating with foreigners to get goodies for concessions, and pursuing illegal and internationally-sanctioned revenue-raising ventures.  At the end of the day, the North Korean economy under Kim Jong-il remains highly vulnerable to shortages of food, energy, and foreign exchange, with pressures for transformation of the economic system coming from both internal and external dynamics of change at work in North Korea.

Looking ahead, the key question is not whether there will be changes in economic policy but whether changes will be in the direction of building a market economy or governed by a new dynamic of competition for resources among contending parties for power.  The more the new regime leans towards the Worker’s Party, the more likely it will follow Chinese supported policies of developing a market economy under the guidance of the Party and gradually shift to funding defence needs from a centralised budget rather than the military having its own economic organs such as trading companies and banks that service them. The more the regime tilts towards the military, the more likely that competition for resources will trump incentives for pursuing systemic change.

While there may be an inclination to perpetuate the patronage practices of the elites by the Kim family, it is not likely that loyalties will transfer simply to the new leadership through such patronage alone. New incentives for supporting the regime will need to be pursued.  Key metrics of such changes will be in: 1) the ownership and transferability rights of assets; 2) the restructuring of the financial system including banking supervision, monetary-management policies, and development of the tax system and public expenditure policies to accommodate a market economy; 3) the support for decentralisation of economic decision-making and empowerment of traders and entrepreneurs; 4) the willingness to follow rules-based international practices in commerce and finance; and 5) the legal reforms to protect rights of parties in a market economy. This is a tall order, but one that might lead to a new dawn for North Korea.

Bradley O. Babson is a consultant on Asian affairs with a focus on Korea and Northeast Asia economic cooperation. He is retired from a career at the World Bank, with a concentration in East Asia. In the early 1990s he worked on the opening up of Vietnam and was the first World Bank Resident Representative in Hanoi.

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After Kim Jong-il: will there be change or continuity in North Korean economic policy?

The statements made by the State Bank of Vietnam recently make people understand that while Vietnam is still busy “putting the banking system in order,” it would nearly say “no” to the establishment of any new
banks.

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SBV sets stricter rules on new bank establishment

Thailand Business News –

This year’s floods have had a vast impact on the property market, with sectors affected across the board. But the impact varies from sector to sector,from residential to industrial.

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Floods Won’t Affect Thai Property Market in the Long Term
Thailand’s property sector is showing signs of an early recovery, as selective investors return to purchasing real estate stocks and actual property.

Some of the credit goes to a one-year government stimulus package that reduces the Special Business Tax from 3.3% to 0.11%, extends the reduction on transfer taxes from 2% to 0.01% and mortgage registration fees and provides a tax deduction on mortgage principal and interest.
Thailand’s property indicators show:

1.The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) index began rebounding in April 2009, and property stocks – while the first to fall in H2/08 – were amongst the first to recover
2. The Bank of Thailand (BoT) has lowered its policy interest rate four times since December 2008, prompting banks to reduce the minimum lending rate (MLR) from 7.25% to 6.25%
3. A continued drop in sales of durable goods due to uncertainty surrounding the economy is highlighted consumer confidence index (CCI) to a historic low of 72.8 in Q1/09 and New housing registrations in Bangkok and surrounding areas fell 43.8% in Q1/09

Recognising that sales would slow, forward-thinking companies took the opportunity to focus on their fundamentals and improve their balance sheets. This was the strategy of Hubert Viriot, CEO of the luxury developer Raimon Land, who was appointed in the midst of the crisis.

Second, Thailand’s banking system is much healthier than its Western counterparts. There are no toxic assets on local banks’ balance sheets. This benefits both the supply and demand side.

But a stable political environment in Thailand would likely see interest rates rise by half a percentage point. And oil prices will float at about US$85 to $95 a barrel. Construction costs will rise when oil prices and interest rates are in an upward trend. Overall housing supply has dropped over the past two years with a decrease in the number of construction permits. Many small-sized developers went bust after failing to access loans from local financial institutions.

Author: Shinji Takagi, Osaka University

Financial integration can be defined in several ways. But the only relevant definition, in the context of ongoing policy debate in Asia, is in terms of bilateral financial links analogous to the way trade integration is typically defined.

No other definition would highlight the asymmetry between trade and finance in Asia. Indeed, some economies are very open financially, and interest rates and equity prices may be highly correlated across some national borders. Despite this, bilateral financial links in the region are much more limited than bilateral trade links.

In 2009, Asia’s intraregional trade amounted to more than 50 per cent of global trade, compared to less than 35 per cent for foreign direct investment (FDI) and around 6 per cent for portfolio investment. Asia’s so-called market-driven economic integration, therefore, yielded a lopsided outcome. In one sense, this outcome is not surprising. Finance is little affected by distance, whereas for trade distance matters critically. Money should flow to a financial centre that offers the smallest intermediation costs and to a country that offers the highest risk-adjusted returns, regardless of the location.

Even so, regional financial integration remains an important unfinished agenda for Asia. Despite there being no theoretical case for preferring regional to global financial integration, promoting regional financial transactions will have its benefits. As the region integrates in trade and production, information is created through face-to-face contacts and the specifics of economic activities. Given the nature of asymmetric information that characterises financial transactions, such local information is more conducive to making regional financing deals than global ones. If markets and institutions are sufficiently developed, then there should be some ‘home bias’ within Asia favouring regional financial transactions. This should be the case even in situations where global transactions offer absolute advantage. The clear lack of home bias in Asia suggests that there are imperfections to be addressed as well as unmet financing needs.

In this respect there are insights to be gained from taking a close look at the cross-border financial links of Japan, the region’s largest creditor country. In 2009 Japan’s intraregional trade with Asia was more than 40 per cent of its total global trade. In contrast, Asia’s share in Japan’s financial transactions was only 24 per cent for FDI assets, and was even smaller, at less than 9 per cent, for FDI liabilities. The importance of Asia was almost negligible for portfolio investments: 8 per cent for equity assets, 1 per cent for debt assets and l.7 per cent for equity liabilities. The exception is Japan’s debt liabilities, where Asia accounted for 18 per cent at the end of 2009. This indicates that Asian investors are active participants in Japan’s large bond market. In terms of cross-border banking flows, Asia’s share was only 7 per cent, broadly similar to the share in total global cross-border bank claims. This suggests that Japanese banks differ little from other international banks in their lending behaviour towards Asia. In short, Japan’s financial links with Asia are much weaker than the links with North America and Europe, though Asia is by far the most important trading partner.

The pattern of investment activity points to a few possible factors to explain Asia’s lopsidedly small share in Japan’s financial transactions, and hence the lack of regional financial integration within Asia. First are the underdeveloped and small domestic capital markets. Second are the capital account restrictions that limit the scope for two-way capital flows. Third are the licensing and other regulatory practices that discriminate ex post against the cross-border activity of Asia-based banks.

Accordingly, in order to promote regional financial integration, the authorities of many of the region’s economies must develop their domestic capital markets further, and make them deep, liquid and efficient. They should also ease or remove controls on the ability of residents to invest abroad. And finally, they should relax the regulatory barriers on the entry of foreign banks, especially those from within the region. Because Asian financial systems remain largely bank-based, promoting this cross-border activity would be especially important.

Undoubtedly part of the limited financial integration we now observe in Asia is related to the stages of development of many of the economies. Regional financial integration is bound to deepen to a level more commensurate with trade integration as Asian economies grow, per capita incomes rise, and financial wealth is accumulated.

Even so, some of the identified gaps require remedial action by governments. This is likely to be a long process because it involves institution and capacity building. Regional cooperative efforts may be needed to safeguard the process of capital account liberalisation and to relax the licensing standards for Asia-based foreign banks. Similarly, regional cooperation may be useful in setting common standards for domestic capital markets and cross-border issues of financial products. In the long run, a region-wide consolidation of domestic capital markets may help create a market with the size, depth and liquidity that is sufficiently attractive to large international and regional investors.

Shinji Takagi is Professor of Economics at the Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Japan.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Asia’s global impact‘.

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Asian financial integration: an unfinished agenda