Siam News Network

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Govt Launches Energy Saving Campaign

Real GDP fell 6.3 percent between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, as global demand slumped, before rebounding 6.9 percent through the end of 2009. The rebound was due to a recovery in global demand, an end to inventory liquidation and a pickup in private consumption as confidence returned.
However, the upside is limited due to political and regulatory uncertainty, including from possible political violence and the Map Ta Phut court case. The government investment plan is proceeding at a slow pace, but public investment should contribute to growth.

With economic pundits forecasting that Asian economies will lead global growth over the next few years, led by emerging giants China and India, it seems logical that investors will shift their funds to Thai and Asian equity markets in search of higher yields.
Many Thai companies don’t even really need to be in the market, with only a limited need to raise capital.

In 1972 the Government took a further step in this direction by amending the “Announcement of the Executive Council No. 58 on the Control of Commercial Undertakings Affecting Public Safety and Welfare”. The changes extended Government control and regulation over the operations of finance and securities companies, which until then had operated fairly freely. Following these amendments, in May 1974, long-awaited legislation establishing “The Securities Exchange of Thailand” (SET) was enacted. This was followed by revisions to the Revenue Code at the end of the year, allowing the investment of savings in the capital market. By 1975 the basic legislative framework was in place and on April 30, 1975, “The Securities Exchange of Thailand” officially started trading. On January 1, 1991 its name was formally changed to “The Stock Exchange of Thailand” (SET).

Ending secretive selection of China’s top leaders doesn’t guarantee peaceful rise NEW HAVEN: The spectacular fall of one of China’s leading politicians, the Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai, reminds foreign policy watchers about the uncertainty that lurks behind the impressive gates of Zhongnanhai. As we look forward to the next decade, the greatest uncertainty – and the greatest risk – in Sino-US relations is what happens in Chinese domestic politics. Domestic politics drives foreign policy in all political systems. In China, national politicians have to worry not just about winning the next election, but about keeping the Chinese Communist Party in power. Behind the headlines we read every day about China’s rise is a country with a political leadership that is extremely insecure, constantly fretting that it might be reaching the end of its reign. It’s also a country with a dysfunctional policy process dominated by powerful interest groups, many of them within the state itself.

The biggest danger isn’t China’s growing economic or military strength. It’s the internal fragility that could drive it to make threats that leaders can’t back down from for fear of loss of internal support – and the possibility of overexpansion, driven by parochial interest groups that would benefit in the short term. I worry that the nature of the Chinese political system challenges the restrained approach to foreign policy laid down by Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s, making it hard for the country to sustain its peaceful rise. Insecurity has been particularly acute since 1989 Tiananmen crisis. Confronting protracted demonstrations in 130-plus cities, the leadership split over how to handle dissent, and the People’s Liberation Army use of force saved the regime. A serious risk for China’s regime is splits at the top of the Chinese Communist Party. China today isn’t seething with unrest. Despite the impressive number – 180,000 in 2010 by the government’s own count – most demonstrations are local, small in scale. But jittery leaders track demonstrations closely, probably more worried than they need to be. A more serious risk to the regime is splits at the top of the Chinese Communist Party. Leninist authoritarian systems fall from the top down. China is ruled by a collective leadership of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Since the Tiananmen crisis, the nine have worked hard to maintain a public façade of unity, successfully hiding from public view the competition that inevitably exists at the top.

They hide the contest for power behind a veil of secrecy because they fear that knowledge of divisions at the top might embolden subordinates or citizens to speak out with new demands in exchange for support. Splits at the top can create a “political opportunity structure” that allows people to demonstrate without fear of punishment. If leaders start trying to differentiate themselves, create public personas and mobilize support from the society at large – as Bo Xilai tried to do –that threatens to unravel the regime. Yet the temptation to reach out beyond the inner circle to build a public following always exists. Even Mao Zedong himself did it when he felt that the bureaucracy was blocking his initiatives – that’s what the Cultural Revolution was all about.

The new media environment is making it more difficult to prevent individual leaders from playing to the public. With thousands of commercial media outlets and 500 million Chinese following the news on the internet, it’s just too easy, too tempting to play to the crowd. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is a media politician, but as a lame duck about to retire next fall, is not too threatening. But when Bo campaigned publicly for the Politburo Standing Committee by staking out a position as a law-and-order populist and neo-Maoist – a desperate move because he was unlikely to get on the Standing Committee otherwise – he threatened everyone else at the top. And they brought him down. Open competition at the top may frighten CCP elite, but doesn’t have to threaten survival of party rule. Open competition at the top feels frightening and destabilizing to the CCP elite, but it doesn’t have to threaten the survival of party rule.

The leaders simply must find a way to manage the competition and prevent it from becoming an all-out war that could destroy the regime. One solution would be to allow open competition for the top posts in an election by the Central Committee, the body of several hundred government, party and military officials that already has the formal power to select CCP leaders.

This is how it sometimes was done in the Soviet Union and is now done in Vietnam: The top vote-getter becomes party secretary, second best becomes premier, and third best becomes president. It would be the next step in the institutionalization of CCP leadership politics. The party almost allowed the Central Committee to hold an open election of the top posts in 2002 when it had to choose the anointed successor for the first time – Hu Jintao had been chosen by Deng Xiaoping. But scared by the possibility of a loss of control, the party took only a baby step in that direction: It held the election as an informal straw poll to gauge appeal of potential leaders and used information from the popularity contest to craft a slate of nominees acceptable to the Central Committee selectors.

The fall of Bo Xilai appears to have encouraged the advocates of economic and political reform to start speaking out in the hopes that their ideas might be taken up at the 18th CCP Congress in the fall. A second burst of reform in China could buoy prospects for Sino-US cooperation. If the economic reformers win, the private sector, which has a strong stake in economic interdependence with the US and the rest of the world, would have a stronger voice, and the state monopolies which use technology standards and policies like indigenous innovation to protect the market for themselves, would be weakened. Steps to strengthen China’s legal system – an important theme of the reformist platform – would encourage Americans to see China as once again “moving in the right direction.” A reform-minded leadership might also exercise greater restraint over the international security and propaganda bureaucracies that have run amok over the past decade in ways that have harmed China’s international reputation and relationships as well as its popularity at home. A China with open institutionalized competition for political power might still be an assertive China. Yet a China with more open institutionalized competition for political power might still be an assertive China.

Tough stands on hot-button issues like Japan, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and South China Sea play well with a nationalist public and the political elite in the Central Committee. Politicians would take care to protect their nationalist flank as they pursue economic and political reforms that threaten vested interests like state corporations. Nor is there any reason to expect a Politburo Standing Committee selected by an open competition to be more effective at exercising supervision over bureaucracies like the State Oceanographic Administration in over-reaching and provoking fights. Earlier last month the oceanographic administration sent two ships to the Diaoyutai Island, Senkaku in Japanese, provoking a clash with the Japanese coast guard; the agency’s spokesman made a statement that the action was purely to assert Chinese sovereignty over the islands. And if the People’s Liberation Army remains a powerful bloc in the Central Committee and ultimate guarantor of CCP rule, there is no reason to anticipate a cut in defense budgets.  Political succession has always been the Achilles heel of authoritarian systems. Bo is unlikely to be the last Chinese politician to use the media to build a public following.

Trying to keep leadership competition under wraps within a black box is a losing proposition. More open competition for power within the party could open up new possibilities for reform that would have positive spillovers for China’s foreign relations. But it’s no guarantee of a China with the political legitimacy and institutional wherewithal to rise peacefully.  Susan Shirk is Ho Miu Lam Professor and chair of the 21st Century China Program at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. She served as US deputy assistant secretary of state with responsibility for China 1997-2000. Her most recent books are China: Fragile Superpower and Changing Media, Changing China.

This article is based on her presentation at the first annual conference of the Johnson Center for the Study of American Diplomacy, held in honor of Henry Kissinger at Yale University in March 2012.

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Power Shift in China – Part III

For a sense of how the China market upends some of the truisms of the luxury car market, take a look at Jaguar’s backloaded new sedan.

The new model — unveiled at the Beijing Auto Show on Monday by Jaguar Land Rover, a unit of India’s Tata Motors — puts an emphasis on the back seat.

Jaguar’s XJ Ultimate, a variant of its XJ line, comes with two iPads embedded in leather-trimmed docks in the backs of the front seat, along with wireless keyboards. The leather-and-wood rear interior also offers an aluminum table between the two seats that lifts to reveal two Champagne flutes, plus a hidden Champagne chiller beside it “to keep the Champagne at the coolest temperature,” said Ian Callum, Jaguar’s director of design.

At the same time, Jaguar is scaling back under the hood. The auto maker unveiled a two-liter, four-cylinder engine as well as a three-liter V6 engine, both at the lower end, “designed with China in mind,” said Bob Grace, Jaguar Land Rover’s China head.

Elsewhere in the world, the luxury auto market is a power game, as auto makers compete to put more powerful engines into high-end vehicles and emphasize the driving and handling experience. But that emphasis doesn’t work as well in China because well-to-do car owners often employ drivers. Analysts criticize other auto makers, such as Ford Motor Co., for being slow to adjust for local tastes.

Jaguar Land Rover has big China ambitions. In recent weeks it struck a deal with China’s Chery Automotive to form a manufacturing joint venture here. That requires government approval, which could be slow in coming.

– Carlos Tejada. Follow him on Twitter @CRTejada

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After keeping its currency tightly linked to the US dollar for years, China in July 2005 revalued its currency by 2 % against the US dollar and moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies.

One demographic consequence of the “one child” policy is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world.

The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.

Nevertheless, key bottlenecks continue to constrain growth.

China is the world’s largest producer of rice and is among the principal sources of wheat, corn (maize), tobacco, soybeans, peanuts (groundnuts), and cotton.

The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.

China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.

The growth in both outbound investment from, and inbound investment to, China reflects the nation’s rising economic power and attractiveness as an investment destination.

But “this is just a beginning.

China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.

China’s challenge in the early 21st century will be to balance its highly centralized political system with an increasingly decentralized economic system.

Since the late 1970s, China has decollectivized agriculture, yielding tremendous gains in production.

In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.

Due to improved technology, the fishing industry has grown considerably since the late 1970s.

Coal is the most abundant mineral (China ranks first in coal production); high-quality, easily mined coal is found throughout the country, but especially in the north and northeast.

China is among the world’s four top producers of antimony, magnesium, tin, tungsten, and zinc, and ranks second (after the United States) in the production of salt, sixth in gold, and eighth in lead ore.

Major industrial products are textiles, chemicals, fertilizers, machinery (especially for agriculture), processed foods, iron and steel, building materials, plastics, toys, and electronics.

Great inland cities include Beijing and the river ports of Nanjing, Chongqing, and Wuhan.

Original post:
Auto Show: Got Back? Jaguar Amps Up Rear for China

Author: Peter Drysdale, Editor, East Asia Forum

The boom in resource prices, fuelled by China’s surging industrialisation and steel demand over the past couple of decades, has lifted Australia’s terms of trade to a 100-year high.

Resource exporters around the world have been enjoying good times.

Australia’s terms of trade are 65 per cent above the average twentieth-century level and 85 per cent above the trend seen in the twentieth century, had that continued. As a result, Australian gross domestic product in nominal terms is about 13 per cent higher than it would have been without these relative price changes.

What goes up, of course, must also come down. A gigantic global supply response to booming resource prices is already under way.

Take the case of iron ore, Australia’s largest export commodity, the price of which leapt from just over $12.68 per tonne in 2001 to $187.18 per tonne in February 2011. Forecasts for growth of Chinese iron ore demand (and India’s attempt to switch from exporting iron ore to supplying growing domestic demand from its own steel industry) have led to a scramble to expand and capitalise on current high prices. Suppliers all around the world are trying to cash in on these high ore prices. The established suppliers in Australia and Brazil have big expansion plans just to keep up with continuing growth in the demand from China’s steel mills, and new suppliers are now scrambling to enter the market.

The big new entrant in global iron ore supply is Africa. Africa has reserves of high-quality iron ore that are estimated to match those in Australia. Over 200 iron ore projects are being contemplated across the African continent.

In the past Africa has not been a significant competitor in the iron ore market. African projects typically require huge infrastructure investments to bring them to market. Western banks have been reluctant to finance these project because of high political and economic risks in most African countries. That, it seems, is all about to change significantly. For one thing, much of Africa has been doing better in economic terms over the past decade. For another, Chinese capital is willing to take the risks in Africa.

In this week’s lead essay Luke Hurst reviews 17 key iron projects across West and Central Africa and provides new estimates of additional iron ore export capacity that are likely to come on stream by 2018.

By 2018, Hurst calculates, China is expected to increase its demand at a steady but slowing rate as its growth becomes less resource intensive. Australia’s Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) forecasts that Chinese iron ore demand will grow 2.8 per cent per annum through to 2018. Other estimates, from the Raw Materials Group, put growth at 3.8 per cent per annum, a percentage point higher than BREE’s projection. Hurst compares global import demand on the higher Chinese demand forecasts with projected global export capacity, including new African capacity five years out, to assess what the impact of new supplies might be on iron ore prices over this period.

Hurst examines projects according to the risk of their falling over — identifying capacity that is very likely to come on stream according to schedule, capacity that has a fair chance, and capacity that is less likely to be operational in the next five years. Hurst’s analysis suggests that Africa will begin to put pressure on prices in the next three to five years. He reckons that iron ore prices are likely to fall back to around $80 per tonne quickly. If more of the planned African capacity comes on stream prices could tumble to $60 per tonne in the next five years.

A price fall of this magnitude, Hurst points out, would still provide intra-marginal producers with healthy profits but it would have serious knock-on effects for the iron ore exporters and their investments in countries such as Australia and Brazil. For one thing it would dry up internally generated investment capital in the major iron ore firms. Iron ore is expected to represent 2.6 per cent of Australia’s GDP in 2011-12, and a drop in iron prices would affect Australia’s terms of trade, exchange rate and income. The falling price would especially constrain the development of Australia’s budding magnetite industry.

In short, any fall in the price of iron ore such as Hurst foreshadows would have significant knock-on effects for the iron ore-centric economies of Australia and Brazil.

Despite the expectation of strong Chinese demand for iron and other resources for some years, the exceptionally tight commodity markets and high resource prices in the past decade seem very likely to ease over the next half decade as supply responds in global markets to the investment opportunities that high prices have generated.

These outcomes are the result of the response in incredibly tight global markets to bringing on stream new sources of international iron ore supply to service the boom in Chinese demand. They take no account of an unanticipated dip in Chinese demand, which in this analysis is assumed to continue to grow steadily.

Nobody has long-term monopoly in resource markets, neither sellers nor buyers. Discouraged from investment in Australia, there’s no question that Chinese and other investment (including by the majors) has gone to Africa and elsewhere to fill the gap, as the Japanese went to Brazil to fill the Australian gap more than thirty years ago.

Peter Drysdale is Editor of the East Asia Forum.

1. Asia, Africa and the contestability of the global iron ore market
2. Iron ore and the market power myth
3. China’s impact on iron ore markets

Read more:
African competition in China’s market for iron ore

Walking through the streets of Hong Kong with its endless rows of jeweler stores packed full of Chinese shoppers, it may seem like the bling business is sparkling.

Chow Tai Fook Jewellery Group Ltd., controlled by Hong Kong billionaire Cheng Yu-tung, made waves through a US$2.8 billion initial public offering last December, educating investors all over the world of the insatiable Chinese appetite for gold.

But after hitting its record high in late January, Chow Tai Fook’s share price has come down by around 21%. Its rival, Luk Fook Holdings (International) Ltd., is down 16% year-to-date.

The stocks have been pummeled by slowing growth in Hong Kong retail sales for the December to February period. In January, retail sales in Hong Kong rose 14.9% year-on-year – which, for an economy heavily reliant by discretionary spending by visitors from across the border, just didn’t quite cut it. As  a comparison, December’s year-on-year increase was 23.5%.

Seasonal factors played a role. Brokerage UOB KayHian said in a note that the proximity of the Lunar New Year this year to Christmas slowed visitor arrivals to Hong Kong. An exceptionally cold January also delayed the traveling plans of some visitors.

But Citigroup sees signs of a recovery in retail sales in March. Figures for the month will be released in the next few days. CIMB believes a slowdown is only natural, after the spectacular run jewelers enjoyed over the past two years, and that there are no grounds to think Chinese people’s appetite for jewelry is abating.

See more on this story at Deal Journal

China has generally implemented reforms in a gradualist or piecemeal fashion.

Economic development has been more rapid in coastal provinces than in the interior, and approximately 200 million rural laborers and their dependents have relocated to urban areas to find work.

The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second largest economy after the United States by both nominal GDP ($5 trillion in 2009) and by purchasing power parity ($8.77 trillion in 2009).

Nevertheless, key bottlenecks continue to constrain growth.

The two sectors have differed in many respects.

A report by UBS in 2009 concluded that China has experienced total factor productivity growth of 4 per cent per year since 1990, one of the fastest improvements in world economic history.

By the early 1990s these subsidies began to be eliminated, in large part due to China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which carried with it requirements for further economic liberalization and deregulation.

On top of this, foreign direct investment (FDI) this year was set to “surpass $100 billion”, compared to $90 billion last year, ministry officials predicted.

In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.

China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.

Although China is still a developing country with a relatively low per capita income, it has experienced tremendous economic growth since the late 1970s.

Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.

Except for the oasis farming in Xinjiang and Qinghai, some irrigated areas in Inner Mongolia and Gansu, and sheltered valleys in Tibet, agricultural production is restricted to the east.

Due to improved technology, the fishing industry has grown considerably since the late 1970s.

Oil fields discovered in the 1960s and after made China a net exporter, and by the early 1990s, China was the world’s fifth-ranked oil producer.

Alumina is found in many parts of the country; China is one of world’s largest producers of aluminum.

Coal is the single most important energy source in China; coal-fired thermal electric generators provide over 70% of the country’s electric power.

Most of China’s large cities, like Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou, are also the country’s main ports.

Read this article:
Shine Comes Off Chinese Jewelers

China’s rise has had very different consequences for its North Asian and Southeast Asian neighbors, in particular, making it difficult for Southeast Asia to break out of the middle income trap.

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Hotel Gal sees the world

Selamat siang (good afternoon) from Kuala Lumpur! A lot has happened since my last post; for starters, I got a job … and an apartment!

Just to give you an idea of what I do…

After settling into KL life, Kim and I both had a few interviews lined up. I scored on my third interview with a hotel close to the Putra World Trade Centre (PWTC) – letʼs call it Hotel Bintang*. Youʼre ʻlookingʼ at their new Housekeeping Attendant! Itʼs a pretty swanky business hotel and I just have to clean the guest rooms. Itʼs not glamorous, but itʼs pretty much the only job available which didnʼt require learning Malay!

Fun times

The people here are unbelievably friendly. They have the biggest smiles and itʼs impossible not to smile back when they turn on the charm – I come home with sore cheeks, for real. There are a few other foreigners in housekeeping with me – Martin from Germany, Ashley from the States, and Jess from Ireland. Thereʼs also Sofea and Ahmad, who are locals. Itʼs been great having a few friendly faces to trade jokes with, and the days have just been flying by.

Our home away from home!

Kim and I now live in the PWTC area, which is super convenient for me since I can walk to work. Kim got an Assistant Kitchen Helper job in the KLCC, which is the Kuala Lumpur City Centre, so she takes public transport to work – the KTM Commuter or the Rapid KL Light Rail Transit (LRT). Luckily theyʼre practically on our doorstep, so she doesnʼt have to travel far either.

The area weʼre in has quite a young vibe – lots of students and young foreigners like ourselves, probably because the universityʼs nearby, so there are lots of affordable condos around here. Weʼve got quite a good deal – we each rent a room (itʼs a three bedroom condo) and our flatmate is a local, Chris. Heʼs really cool, and has been showing us around in our free time.

Putra World Trade Centre

Getting settled

Whatʼs awesome about the condominium is that it has a shared swimming pool, a small gym, and a tiny convenience store (a bit like a tuck shop). Weʼre not far from the shopping mall either though, so weʼre really sorted.

We were sad to say goodbye to Hotel KL* but you can only eat so many buffet breakfasts… Plus itʼs nice having my own space. Iʼve got my room all set up, and have been spending a lot of time in Chinatown doing some budget shopping!

The Petronas Twin Towers

Iʼm slowly getting the hang of finding my way around. I mostly use public transport or walk everywhere. KLʼs quite a green city with lots of parks, which I hadnʼt expected. In every spare moment we get, weʼve been on a sightseeing mission – MUST SEE EVERYTHING!!!

So far Iʼve ticked off the Petronas Twin Towers and skybridge, the KLCC park, the Suria KLCC mall, the Petrosains Science Centre, Chinatown, Kampung Baru, the Batu Caves, and lots lots more. But thatʼs a story for another time…

* Not its real name

Link to article:

Settling into Malaysian life

Originally posted here:
Settling into Malaysian life

Author: Sam Byfield, Melbourne

It has been an interesting few months in Chinese politics.

On top of the imminent national-level leadership transition and the removal of Politburo member Bo Xilai in Chongqing, the tension between economic development and human rights in Guangdong province has played out in a fascinating way.

The small fishing village of Wukan came together to elect a new village committee on 3 March. This election followed six months of protests over unsatisfactorily low compensation for land evictions — a common complaint across China. The protests escalated after the arrests of several participants and the death in custody of protest leader Xue Jinbo. Protests and violent confrontations have become commonplace in China; the Chinese Academy of Governance estimates that the number of protests doubled between 2006 and 2010, rising to 180,000 reported ‘mass incidents’. One of the main causes of such unrest is the absence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms. A common theme in these incidents is that the government often has a vested economic interest in the situation, and the judicial system is unable to play the role of impartial referee. As a consequence, the police are called in to deal with the protesters.

A key factor that has distinguished Wukan from other protests across China is that instead of responding with violent suppression, provincial authorities in Guangdong allowed an election to replace the entire village committee with independently elected representatives. The election was supervised by a local committee and monitored by external observers, who deemed it credible. This was made possible in large part by the direct intervention of an influential provincial political figure, Wang Yang, Guangdong’s party secretary. Wang is regarded as among China’s more liberal senior political figures. Notably, he is also competing this year for a position on the Politburo Standing Committee, the most senior level of China’s power structure.

If widespread change is to occur, it needs to be mandated at the top, and there is a real possibility that Wang’s ascension to the Standing Committee could lead to more political reform. Interestingly, senior Communist Party figures seem to support Wang’s actions. During a visit to Shuili village in Guangzhou on 4 February, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao emphasised the importance of protecting farmers’ rights, and expressed his support for direct village elections. He also noted in his much publicised ‘farewell address’ on 14 March the importance of social justice, particularly relating to judicial injustice and income disparity. And the People’s Daily newspaper, generally regarded as the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, praised Wang’s actions and his moral authority.

The drive for change also needs continued bottom-up support. China’s blogging community has been ablaze with commentary about Wukan, most of it positive and hopeful. One user of blogging site Sina Weibo asserted that ‘this is the start of something new’, while in the popular discussion forum Maoyan Kanren a user drew upon one of Mao’s revolutionary slogans, writing: ‘if you want freedom and democracy, you have to fight for it yourself — a single spark can start a prairie fire’. Drawing inspiration from Wukan, similar calls for elections have been made in Zhejiang and other provinces in the south.

What has happened in Wukan, and across China, relates to a fundamental tension present across the country: a desire for a say in how things are run, for a relaxing of controls that govern people’s lives and for ‘justice’. Watching how this tension evolves over the coming years, and how it is handled by China’s local, provincial and national authorities, will provide useful clues on the long-term trajectory of Chinese political reform.

Sam Byfield works in the international development sector.

1. Hong Kong’s precarious quest for democracy
2. Do Thais lack spirit for democracy?
3. Burma’s National League for Democracy: A fateful choice?

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Democracy comes to China via Wukan